The Impact of Bank Entry in the Japanese Corporate Bond Underwriting Market by C.R. McKenzie & Sumiko Takaoka
T h eI m p a c to fB a n kE n t r yi nt h eJ a p a n e s eC o r p o r a t eB o n d
Underwriting Market
Sumiko Takaoka








Both authors wish to thank Yoshiaki Shikano and seminar participants at Keio University
for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper, Takayuki Atake and Shigeyuki
Suzuki for helpful discussions, and Nikko Citigroup Limited for providing the data on corporate
bond spreads. The ﬁnancial assistance of a research grant provided by the Foundation to
Promote Research on the Japanese Economy (Nihon keizai kenkyu shorei zaidan)i sg r a t e f u l l y
acknowledged. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Autumn Meeting of the
Japanese Economic Association held at Hiroshima University, October 2002.
∗ Address for correspondence: C.R. McKenzie, Faculty of Economics, Keio University, 2-
15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan. Tel: 81-3-5427-1831. Fax: 81-3-5427-1578.
1T h eI m p a c to fB a n kE n t r yi nt h eJ a p a n e s eC o r p o r a t eB o n d
Underwriting Market
ABSTRACT
The 1993 Japanese ﬁnancial system reform allowed banks to enter the underwriting market
for corporate bonds through bank-owned security subsidiaries. This paper examines empir-
ically whether underwriting commissions and spreads for corporate bonds fell as a result of
this bank entry. The empirical results show that bank entry signiﬁcantly lowers underwriting
commissions. Commissions charged by banks are signiﬁcantly lower than those charged by
investment houses. In contrast, there is no strong evidence that bond spreads are signiﬁcantly
lowered by bank entry. A main bank relationship between the issuing ﬁrm and the parent of
a bank-owned underwriting subsidiary does not have any signiﬁcant inﬂuence in commission
setting or the determination of spreads.
Keywords: ﬁnancial system reform, bank entry, bank share, commission, main bank, spread,
underwriting.
JEL Classifications Numbers:G 2 ,K 2 2
21 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Financial System Reform Act in 1993 in respect
of its eﬀect on the Japanese corporate bond market. Although reform of Japanese ﬁnancial
system continues, the Financial System Reform Act in 1993 was an historical change in Japan.
The explicit purpose of this ﬁnancial reform was to promote competition in the Japanese bond
corporate market and to provide better service. The implicit purpose was to lower the costs of
bond raisings for issuing ﬁrms. The focus of this paper is to verify whether these purposes of the
ﬁnancial reform were achieved. The Financial System Reform Act which became eﬀective on 1
April 1993 allowed banks to engage in securities business. When a bank engages in both loan
and securities business, there is a possibility that conﬂicts of interest will occur (for discussions
of this conﬂict of interest, see Puri (1996, 1999), Hamao and Hoshi (2000), Konishi (2002) and
Takaoka and McKenzie (2003))1. Banks were not permitted to directly enter the securities
business, but rather had to enter through a subsidiary. If the Financial System Reform Act
works as anticipated, commissions earnt by underwriters are expected to be lower than before
the Act became eﬀective, when underwriters appeared to enjoy high underwriting fees on bond
issues.
This paper investigates the factors inﬂuencing the costs of raising funds by corporate bond
issues in the domestic market, namely, underwriting commissions and spreads (the diﬀerence
between returns on assets issued by the private sector and government bonds). Underwriting
commissions and spreads in the domestic bond market are analysed over the period from
January 1992, following a change in the method for underwriting corporate bonds, to March
2002.
The literature to date on the impact of the entry of bank-subsidiary (Section 20 sub-
sidiaries) security companies on the American corporate bond underwriting market has focused
on whether bank entry has (a) led to conﬂict of interest or certiﬁcation eﬀects (for example,
1Not only was the direct participation of banks in securities business prohibited, but ﬁrewall regulations were
imposed by the Ministry of Finance. For example, these regulations prohibited the exchange of undisclosed
information without the customer’s permission.
3Gande et al. (1997) and Roten and Mullineaux (2002)); and (b) had favourable competitive
eﬀects on gross spreads and yield spreads (for example, Gande et al. (1999) and Roten and
Mullineaux (2002)). The available evidence on both issues is mixed. While Gande et al. (1997)
report signiﬁcant certiﬁcation eﬀects for banks, Roten and Mullineaux (2002) using data for a
later period ﬁnd no evidence that a prior bank lending relationship aﬀects yields. Gande et al.
(1999) report that bank entry in 1989 led to a signiﬁcant decline in underwriter spreads and
ex-ante yields. Roten and Mullineaux (2002) fail to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant competitive eﬀects on
gross yields or yield spreads associated with regulatory changes in 1997 that eased restrictions
on the activities of Section 20 subsidiaries.
In contrast, the literature to date on the impact of the entry of bank-subsidiary securities
companies on the Japanese corporate bond underwriting market has focused on (a) whether
bank entry has led to conﬂict of interest or certiﬁcation eﬀects on spreads (Hamao and Hoshi
(2000, 2002) and Takaoka and McKenzie (2003)); and (b) the choice of underwriter in the
post-bank entry environment (Yasuda (2001)). Hamao and Hoshi (2000) using 31 months of
data on spreads immediately after bank entry ﬁnd no evidence statistically signiﬁcant conﬂict
of interest or certiﬁcation eﬀects. In a slightly more sophisticated analysis, Hamao and Hoshi
(2002) using 34 months of data on spreads immediately after bank entry present very weak
evidence supporting the existence of conﬂict of interest eﬀects. Takaoka and McKenzie (2003)
ﬁnd no evidence of either conﬂict of interest or certiﬁcation eﬀects using data on spreads on
bonds issued in 1999.
This paper diﬀers from the existing literature in several respects. First, the direct com-
petition eﬀect of bank entry is considered by using a sample period that includes data for
both before and after the Financial System Reform Act in Japan. Second, unlike Hamao and
Hoshi (2000, 2002) who only examine spreads, here both commissions and spreads are analysed.
Third, the share of the issuing ﬁrm’s loans made by the ﬁrm’s main bank is used to measure
the strength of the ﬁrm’s main bank relationship. Fourth, in the model for spreads, Tobin’s
qi su s e da sap r o x yf o rt h eﬁrm’s expected future proﬁts. There is some evidence that a rise
4in Tobin’s q leads to a fall in the spread on a ﬁrm’s bond issue. Fifth, given that ten years
of data are being analysed, several macroeconomic variables are used to explain variations in
the magnitude of the spread over the business cycle. It is found that these macroeconomic
variables are statistically signiﬁcant in explaining variations in the spread. Although the re-
l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nm a c r o e c o n o m i cf a c t o r sa n ds p r e a d sh a sb e e nd i s c u s s e di nt h el i t e r a t u r eo n
spread determination (see Roma and Walter (1997) and Athanassakos and Carayannopoulos
(2002)), papers examining the impact of bank entry on corporate bond spreads and underwrit-
ing commissions have tended to ignore these macroeconomic factors or modeled them using
simple dummy variables (see, for example, Gande et al. (1987, 1989), Hamao and Hoshi (2000,
2002), and Roten and Mullineaux (2002)).
The empirical results show that bank entry signiﬁcantly lowers underwriting commissions
and, moreover, commissions fall as the bank share in the underwriting market increases. Com-
missions charged by banks are signiﬁcantly lower than those charged by securities companies,
and this diﬀerence appears to persist throughout the post-entry period. In contrast to the
United States, there is no strong evidence that bond spreads are signiﬁcantly lowered by bank
entry. A main bank relationship between the issuing ﬁrm and the parent of the bank owned
underwriting subsidiary does not have any signiﬁcant inﬂuence in commission setting or the
determination of spreads.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the Japanese underwriting
market, changes in regulations relating to issuing requirements, and the method used for un-
derwriting bonds in Japan. The hypotheses to be tested empirically are discussed in section
3 ,a n dt h em o d e l st ob ee s t i m a t e da r ed e t a i l e di ns e c t i o n4 . T h ed a t au s e da r ee x p l a i n e di n
section 5, and section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Japanese Bond and Underwriting Market
For a long period of time, Japan had a ﬁnancial system which was divided strictly between
banking business and security business. One reason for this strict division was the possibility
5of conﬂicts of interest when a ﬁnancial institution engages in both loan and securities business.
Hence, prior to 1993, banks wanting to engage in underwriting business within Japan were
denied the permission to do so. Section 65 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1948 deﬁned
that the only players in the corporate bond underwriting market were security companies. This
division has been the subject of discussions on deregulation for a long time. One reason is that
t h ec u s t o m e r s ,h e r et h ei s s u i n gﬁrms, were not satisﬁed with the service provided in the highly
regulated market. Long discussions ﬁnally led to the Financial System Reform Act in 1993,
which allowed banks to enter the underwriting market through a security ﬁrm subsidiary. In
this paper, the term ’investment house’ refers to those securities companies that do not have a
bank as their parent company.
The ﬁrst bank entrants in the form of security ﬁrm subsidiaries were IBJ Securities, Nor-
inchukin Securities and LTCB Securities established in July 1993. Sumitomo Trust Securities
and Mitsubishi Trust Securities entered in November 1993. City banks followed by establish-
ing their subsidiary securities companies in November 1994. Between July 1993 and April
1996, twenty new bank subsidiary securities companies were established. The ﬁrst underwrit-
ing of corporate bond by a bank subsidiary did not occur until 25 February 1994 (Hamao and
Hoshi (2000)). Bank-owned security ﬁrm subsidiaries expanded their share in the underwriting
market smoothly. When underwriters are ranked by the total value of bonds for which they
were the lead underwriter (shukanji), in ﬁscal year 1995, ten bank-owned subsidiaries ranked
in the top ﬁfteen underwriters, but there was a big diﬀerence in the shares held by the top
four investment houses and the bank subsidiaries. Daiwa Securities, an investment house that
ranked fourth, gained a share of 15.1%, whereas IBJ Securities, the top bank subsidiary and
ranked ﬁfth, had a share of only 5.7%. The top four investment houses at the time (Nomura,
Nikko, Yamaichi and Daiwa) managed to keep their high rankings. That is, bank entry into
the underwriting market appeared to provide serious competition to the ten intermediate size
security companies such as New Japan, Kankaku, Kokusai and Wako. The share of these ten
intermediate size security companies decreased from 17.3% in ﬁscal year 1994 to 12.1% in ﬁscal
6year 1996. Their shares gradually decreased as a result of bank entry (see Matsuo (1999) for
a detailed explanation). Gradually, the bank subsidiaries expanded their shares, and the total
share held by bank-owned security subsidiaries in the market more than doubled from 22.1%
in ﬁscal year 1995 to 53.0% in ﬁscal year 1997. Behind these ﬁgures, it is natural to consider
the harsh competition brought about by bank entry.
This suggests that bank entry were successful. However, the harsh competition caused by
bank entry decreased the proﬁts of individual companies. Among the bank-owned subsidiaries,
IBJ Securities and LTCB Securities increased their proﬁts. On the other hand, the average
proﬁts of all bank-owned subsidiaries were negative for each ﬁscal year from 1993 to 1996. Two
out of ﬁve bank subsidiaries showed a loss in ﬁscal year 1993, eight out of fourteen subsidiaries
in ﬁscal year 1994, six out of seventeen subsidiaries in ﬁscal year 1995, and twelve out of
nineteen subsidiaries showed a loss in ﬁscal year 1996 (see Matsuo (1999)). It appears that
the security companies competed with each other to maximize their own market share after
bank entry, rather than maximize their proﬁts each year. As a result, the market share of
bank-owned subsidiaries increased at the expense of their proﬁts.
Prior to February 1987, in order to be eligible to issue corporate bonds, ﬁrms needed to
satisfy issuing standards (tekisai kijun)t h a ts p e c i ﬁed numerical standards relating to various
ﬁnancial indices. In February 1987, the standards were amended to incorporate ratings so that
the numerical standards a ﬁrm was required to meet depended on its rating. From November
1990, issuing standards were, in principle, based on ratings only so that ﬁrms with a BBB
or higher rating were eligible to issue secured bonds, and ﬁr m sw i t ha nAo rh i g h e rr a t i n g
were eligible to issue unsecured bonds. These ratings standards were completely abolished in
January 1996 (for further details, see Tachi (1994), Matsuo (1999) and Takeda et al. (2000)).
Under the ’proposal method’ for underwriting corporate bonds that began to be used in
May 1987, ﬁrms would have several securities companies present proposals detailing issuing
conditions including the issuing price and coupon rate. The issuing ﬁr mw o u l dt h e nu s et h i s
and other information to choose a lead manager for the issue, and ﬁnally the lead manager
7and the issuing ﬁrm would consult and determine the issuing conditions. From April 1988, this
method was used for all straight bonds. It has been suggested that the proposal method led to
issuing conditions that ignored market conditions and that underwriters often discounted the
bonds during the subscription period.
The ’ﬁxed price reoﬀer method’ (kinitsu kakaku hanbai hoshiki) is currently used for
issuing most straight bonds. Based on surveys of expected investor demand conducted by the
lead manager, the lead manager and the issuing ﬁrm agree on a selling price for the bond.
During the subscription period the bonds are sold to investors at this uniform price. This
method was ﬁrst employed on an issue of NTT bonds in December 1991. For nearly all bonds
issued publicly in Japan, underwriters are required to purchase any bonds that remain unsold
at the end of the subscription period.
3H y p o t h e s e s
This section presents the hypotheses to be examined empirically in section 6.
3.1 Relationship between the spread and bank entry
One reason why bank entry in the underwriting market has been the subject of so much dis-
cussion is the possibility that banks may drive investment houses out of the market. Compared
to investment houses, banks potentially already have superior information about issuing ﬁrms
through their lending activities. If this is true, banks may have the ability to evaluate issuing
ﬁrms more accurately than investment houses. This is called the bank certiﬁcation eﬀect. In
Japan, this eﬀect may be especially strong when the parent of the securities company is the
issuing ﬁrm’s main bank.
Investors are likely to be willing to accept a lower spread on a security that has been
evaluated by an underwriter based on more accurate and reliable information, and/or superior
ability. If it is true that banks have superior information compared to investment houses, bonds
underwritten by bank subsidiaries should have lower spreads. In the United States, Gande et al.
8(1997) and Puri (1996) provide some empirical evidence suggesting that corporate bonds in the
United States underwritten by banks have lower spreads compared to those bonds underwritten
by investment houses. Gande et al. (1997) ﬁnd this diﬀerential in the spreads associated with
bonds underwritten by banks and investment houses is greater in the non-investment-grade
segment of the market.
The expected relationship between bank entry and the spread is that bank entry lowers
the spread via an indirect eﬀect. Suppose that banks through their monitoring activities
have superior information to evaluate the issuing ﬁrm. Bank entry provides an incentive for
investment houses to make greater eﬀort to search for information and material to evaluate the
issuing ﬁrm more accurately. Otherwise, investment houses may be driven out of the market.
Hence, the spread is expected to fall after bank entry.
3.2 Relationship between commissions and bank entry
T h ec o m m i s s i o ni st h ef e et h a tt h eu n d e r w r i t e rr e c e i v e sf r o mt h ei s s u i n gﬁrm to cover the cost
of the underwriting services provided. Hamao and Hoshi (2002, p. 12) claim that ’underwriting
fees for corporate bonds of the same maturity were ﬁxed across underwriters until the beginning
of 1998’, so that underwriters could not undercut the market in setting commissions. This
claim does not appear to be correct. For example, in June 1993, it was reported that Nomura
Securities had reduced its commissions in anticipation of bank entry (Nikkei Shinbun, 2 June
1993). In our data set, for example, in 1993 on bonds of four (ﬁve) years maturity, commissions
vary between 40 and 55 yen (45 and 50 yen) per 10,000 yen issued. While at any point in time
underwriters may have charged the same commissions, this does not mean that commissions did
not change over time, and underwriters were not free to change the commissions they charged.
Given that underwriters are able to set commissions individually, bank entry is expected to
have a direct eﬀect on commissions by causing them to fall. Competition brought about by bank
entry causes underwriters to oﬀer lower commissions compared to their rivals in order to win
customers. For the new entrants with little or no experience in the market, lowering commission
9charges in order to gain market share is a natural strategy. Even for existing underwriters,
commissions should probably be lowered in order to maintain their existing market share.
Here, this paper considers it a natural outcome for bank entry to cause underwriters to
lower their commissions. The reason is that the bond market was a highly regulated market
until the Financial System Reform Act in 1993. Although gradual deregulation had taken
place before this Act, this was the ﬁrst time for the domestic underwriting market to see
so many simultaneous entrants. If commissions before 1993 reﬂected economic rents induced
by the regulated market, ﬁercer competition caused by bank entry should lead to a fall in
commissions. In the short run, the main objective of bank subsidiaries, the new entrants, is
not likely to be the maximization of short-run proﬁts, but rather gains in market share. In this
case, the hypothesis that commissions will fall after bank entry is likely to be supported.
4M o d e l
4.1 Commissions
Based on the models for gross spreads used in Gande et al. (1999) and Roten and Mullineaux
(2002), the following model for underwriting commissions was assumed:
COMMISSIONj = α0 + α1log(AMOUNTj)+α2DAAj + α3DAj + α4DBBBj
+α5SMATj + α6LMATj + α7SECUREDj + α8BANKENTRYj




βkINDUSTRYjk + uj, (1)
where COMMISSION is the underwriting commission paid for issue j; AMOUNT is the size
of the bond issue; DAA is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value unity if the issuing ﬁrm’s
rating is AA+, AA or AA-, and zero otherwise; DA is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value
unity if the issuing ﬁrm’s rating is A+, A or A-, and zero otherwise; DBBB is a 0-1 dummy
variable taking the value unity if the issuing ﬁrm’s rating is BBB+, BBB or BBB-, and zero
otherwise; SMAT is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value unity if the issue is a short-term
10issue (less than ﬁve years in maturity), and zero otherwise; LMAT is a 0-1 dummy variable
taking the value unity if the issue is a long-term issue (greater than 15 years in maturity),
and zero otherwise; SECURED is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the unity if there is some form
of mortgage associated with the bond, and zero otherwise; BANKENTRY is a 0-1 dummy
variable taking the value unity if the bond is issued on or after 25 February 1994, and zero
otherwise; MARKET is the market share of corporate bond underwritings held by bank-owned
subsidiaries in the ﬁscal year the bond was issued; BANK is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the
value unity if the lead underwriter is a bank-owned subsidiary, and zero otherwise; MAINUW is
a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value unity if the lead underwriter is a bank-owned subsidiary
and the parent bank is the issuing ﬁrm’s main bank, and zero otherwise; LOANSHARE is the
share of loans to the issuing ﬁrm made by the issuing ﬁrm’s main bank; and INDUSTRY are
a set of industry dummies.
Although some of the bank owned subsidiaries were established before February 1994, the
ﬁrst bank subsidiary underwriting of a bond issue occurred on 25 February 1994 (Hamao and
Hoshi (2000)). BANKENTRY is deﬁn e dt oc o r r e s p o n dw i t ht h i sﬁrst issue.
The deﬁnitions of the ratings variables (DAA, DA, DBBB) indicate that the base ratings
group is AAA. As it is hypothesised that underwriting commissions rise with the riskiness of
t h eb o n di s s u e ,i ti se x p e c t e dt h a tα4 > α3 > α2 > 0. The deﬁnitions of SMAT and LMAT
indicate that the base maturity group is bonds with maturities between 5 and 15 years. The
maturity split created by SMAT and LMAT follows Gande et al.’s (1999) analysis. Matsuo’s
(1999) tables of underwriting commissions at selected points in time indicate that commissions
are larger for longer maturity bonds. Thus, it is expected that α5 < 0, and α6 > 0. Since there
is less risk for an underwriter when the bond has some sort of guarantee, it is expected that
α7 < 0. Following the discussion in section 3.2 it is expected that α8 < 0, α9 < 0, and α10 < 0.
The key role of the main bank in corporate ﬁnance in Japan is often stressed in the literature
(see Aoki and Patrick (1994) and Hoshi and Kashyap (2001)). One facet of this role is that the
main bank is often argued to have superior access to private information on the ﬁrms it deals
11with or given its long standing relationship with the ﬁrm superior ability to process information
about the ﬁr m .I ft h i si st h ec a s et h ec o e ﬃcients on MAINUW and MAINUW*LOANSHARE
w o u l db ee x p e c t e dt ob en e g a t i v e( α11,α12 < 0). The reason for including LOANSHARE is to
attempt to take account of the strength of the main bank relationship. It should be noted that
since the equation already includes BANK, the coeﬃcient on MAINUW measures the impact
of the bank underwriter being the ﬁrm’s main bank compared to the case when it is not. An
alternative argument for including MAINUW and MAINUW*LOANSHARE is that there are
many varied transactions occurring between the main bank and the borrowing ﬁrm, and the
main bank may set commissions in the light of the overall main bank-ﬁrm relationship. In
this case, the signs of the coeﬃcients α11 and α12 are ambiguous as the main bank may oﬀer
preferential commissions in return for a higher return on another transaction or vice versa.
4.2 Spreads
Consistent with the models for spreads estimated in the literature (see Gande et al. (1999), Puri
(1999), Hamao and Hoshi (2000), and Takaoka and McKenzie (2003)), the following models for
the spread was assumed:
SPREADj = γ0 + γ1log(AMOUNTj)+γ2DAAj + γ3DAj + γ4DBBBj
+γ5SMATj + γ6LMATj + γ7SECUREDj + γ8TOBINQj
+γ9BANKENTRYj + γ10MARKETj + γ11BANKj + γ12MAINUWj
+γ13MAINUWjLOANSHAREj + γ14AGEj + γ15QDUMj
+γ164CPIj + γ174IIPj +
X
j
δkINDUSTRYjk + vj, (2)
where SPREAD is the diﬀerence between the rate of the return on bond issue j and the return
on a long-term government bond of similar maturity at the time the bond was issued; TOBINQ
is the value of issuing ﬁrm’s Tobin q in the accounting year immediately prior to the issuance;
AGE is the number years that have elapsed since the company was formed; QDUM is a quarterly
trend variable; 4 CPI is the annual inﬂation rate computed using the consumer price index;
12and 4 IIP is the annual growth rate of the index of industrial production. The other variables
are deﬁn e da sf o rt h ec o m m i s s i o ne q u a t i o n .
The discussion in section 3.1 suggests that γ9 < 0a n dγ10 < 0. The sign of γ11 depends
on whether certiﬁcation eﬀects or conﬂict of interest eﬀects dominate. Lower ratings imply a
higher risk of default so it is expected that γ4 > γ3 > γ2 > 0. Bonds with some sort of guarantee
a r ee x p e c t e dt oh a v el o w e rs p r e a d s( γ7 < 0 ). Following the arguments in Athanassakos and
Carayannopoulos (2002), it is expected that γ16 > 0a n dγ17 < 0.
5D a t a
The sample period for both commissions and spreads analysed in this paper runs from 1 January
1992 to 31 March 2002. The starting point of January 1992 is chosen to follow the introduction
in late 1991 of a new method for underwriting corporate bonds (see Section 2).
Data on bond issues by individual ﬁrms that includes ratings information, issue rates, issue
amounts, underwriter names, the year the issuing ﬁrm was established, details of any mortgages
associated with the issue, and issue amounts are taken from the IN Information System’s (INIS)
IN Firm Finance Data Base. This data base also contains annual data on the market shares of
individual underwriters in the corporate bond market between ﬁscal years 1991 and 2001. The
market share data are used to compute the annual market share held by bank-owned security
subsidiaries. Prior to ﬁscal year 1994, the annual market share held by bank-owned security
subsidiaries was zero. In order to maximize the sample size, the maximum of the ratings
provided by four ratings institutions, Rating and Investment Information, Inc., Japan Credit
Rating Agency, Japan Bond Rating Institute, and Standard and Poors, was used. Spreads on
corporate bonds at the time they were issued were obtained from Nikko Citigroup, and were
matched with the individual issues in the INIS IN Firm Finance Data Base.
Tobin’s q is proxied by the market to book ratio of the ﬁrm, where the market value of the
ﬁrm is deﬁned as the sum of the market values of stocks outstanding and interest bearing debt,
and the total amount of assets is used as a proxy for the book value. Data on these variables
13are obtained from the Nikkei Needs Corporate Data Base.
Information on a ﬁrm’s outstanding loans was taken from the Toyo Keizai’s Kigyo Keiretsu
Soran. A ﬁrm’s main bank was identiﬁed as the private ﬁnancial institution (excluding life
insurance companies) that has the largest amount of loans outstanding to the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm
with no outstanding loans is deemed to have no main bank. When a ﬁrm has two ﬁnancial
institutions with exactly the same largest loan shares, the main bank of the ﬁrm cannot be
identiﬁed, and is treated as missing. Data on the consumer price index and the index of
industrial production were obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS Macroeconomic Data Base. For
the purpose of creating the industry dummies, ﬁrms were assigned to thirty two industries
using the industry classiﬁcation in the Toyo Keizai’s Kaisha Shikiho.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the key variables in the analysis for the
full sample (1 January 1992- 31 March 2002) and by underwriter type for the Post-Entry
sample (25 February 1994- 31 March 2002). The descriptive statistics reveal that for banks,
on average, commissions tend to be lower, and the maturity of an issue tends to be shorter
compared to issues underwritten by investment houses. In the United States, Gande et al.
(1999) suggest that bank entry into the underwriting market was concentrated in the smaller
and lower quality end of the corporate bond underwriting market. The descriptive statistics
in Table 1 indicate that, on average, in Japan bank subsidiary security companies tend to
underwrite smaller issues, and issues with AA or A ratings. Table 2 provides a more detailed
distribution of the ratings of bonds underwritten by investment houses and bank subsidiaries
for the post-bank entry sample period (25 February 1994 to March 2002). The key diﬀerence
between investment houses and bank subsidiaries is for AAA rated bonds where investment
houses have an overwhelming advantage. In most of the remaining groups, the shares for both
types of underwriter are roughly the same.
[Table 1 around here]
[Table 2 around here]
146 Empirical Results
All equations reported in this paper are estimated by ordinary least squares using LIMDEP
8 . 0( s e eG r e e n e( 2 0 0 2 ) ) .
6.1 Commissions
The average commission on 190 bonds issued in the period 1 January 1992 to 24 February 1994
is 52.73 yen per 10000 yen issued, which is statistically higher than the average commission of
41.81 yen per 10000 yen issued on the 3,019 bonds issued in the period 25 February 1994 to
31 March 2002 (p value=0.00). While this simple analysis ignores all the other factors that
may inﬂuence commissions, it suggests that there was a signiﬁcant reduction in commissions
around February 1994.
Estimates of equation (1) for underwriting commissions using data from 1 January 1992 to
31 March 2002 are presented as equation (3.1) in Table 3. The control variables generally have
the expected signs: riskier issues and longer maturity issues all have higher commissions. For
the purposes of this study, the three important variables are BANKENTRY, MARKET and
BANK. In equation (3.1), the estimated coeﬃcient on BANKENTRY is negative (-11.27) and
statistically signiﬁcant. The size of this coeﬃcient relative to the size of the coeﬃcients of the
ratings variables and relative to the average size of commissions presented in Table 1 provide
a guide to its economic importance. The other measure of bank entry, MARKET, is also
found to have a negative coeﬃcient, that is, as the market share of bank subsidiaries increases
commissions tend to fall. However, this coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. The result
for the coeﬃcient of BANKENTRY is consistent with the entry of bank-owned subsidiaries
into the bond underwriting market leading to a signiﬁcant one-oﬀ r e d u c t i o ni nu n d e r w r i t i n g
commissions. In addition, the estimated coeﬃc i e n to fB A N Ki n( 3 . 1 )s u g g e s t st h a tb a n k -
owned subsidiaries on average oﬀer lower commissions than investment houses, and that this
diﬀerence in commissions is statistically signiﬁcant. It is worth noting that neither of the main
15bank related variables, MAINUW or MAINUW*LOANSHARE, is statistically signiﬁcant2.
[Table 3 around here]
For the United States, Gande et al. (1999) ﬁnd that there is a much larger impact of bank
entry for bonds with low ratings. In order to verify whether there is a similar eﬀect in Japan,
ﬁrms were divided into two groups, those with low ratings (A+ or less), and those with high
ratings (AA- or higher). For these two groups, the estimated models for commissions (equation
(1) excluding some of the ratings variables) are presented as equations (3.2) and (3.3) in Table
3.
The estimated results in Table 3 suggest that bank entry as measured by the BANKENTRY
variable had the eﬀect of signiﬁcantly reducing commissions for both groups of ﬁrms. However,
the impact is far larger for highly rated ﬁrms (-13.28) than for lower rated ﬁrms (-7.20), and
this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. When the impact of bank entry is measured using
the market share of bank subsidiaries, MARKET, again the impact of entry is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant for issuing ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hb o n dr a t i n g s ,b u ti n s i g n i ﬁcant for ﬁrms with
low bond ratings.
Issues were also divided into small issues (less than 13 billion yen) and large issues (greater
than or equal to 13 billion yen). For these two groups, the estimated models for commissions
are presented as equations (3.4) and (3.5) in Table 3. The results here are similar to those
for the ratings groups in that the impact of BANKENTRY is far larger for large bond issues
compared to small bond (but the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁc a n t ) ,a n dw h e nM A R K E T
is used to measure the impact of bank entry, the impact of entry is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant for large issues, but insigniﬁcant for small issues. Across all four groups, it is found
that bank-owned subsidiaries oﬀer signiﬁcantly lower commissions.
The results in Table 3 suggest that bank-owned subsidiaries oﬀer commissions that are
signiﬁcantly smaller than those oﬀered by investment houses. To verify whether this was just
2Throughout this paper, it is assumed that BANK and MAINUW are exogenous variables. Tests for sample
selection bias were conducted, but there was no evidence to support the use of a more sophisticated estimation
procedure.
16a result of vigorous competition immediately following bank entry or whether this signiﬁcant
diﬀerence continued over time, a restricted version of equation (1) was estimated using data for
each calendar year between 1994 and 2000. Table 4 only reports the results of the estimated
coeﬃcient on the BANK dummy variable in these regressions. The estimated coeﬃcients on
this variable are negative in every year, and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in four
of the seven years. The variation in the size of the estimated coeﬃcients across time can be
partially attributed to the sample sizes being used to estimate these equations. This suggests
that bank subsidiaries have continued to oﬀer lower commissions.
[Table 4 around here]
In contrast to the analysis of underwriting commissions in Table 3 that includes data from both
before and after bank entry, the analysis in Table 5 is limited to commissions on issues after
bank entry (from 25 February 1994). In Table 5, the analysis of commissions is also undertaken
b ys i z eo ft h ei s s u ea n db yt h er a t i n go ft h eﬁrm. The impact of bank entry measured by
MARKET is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in its impact on commissions for large bond
issues and those issues by highly rated ﬁrms. Again it is observed that commissions on bonds
with a bank-owned subsidiary as the main underwriter have signiﬁcantly lower commissions in
all the equations in Table 5. This diﬀerence appears to be larger for small issues and for lowly
rated issues.
[Table 5 around here]
6.2 Spreads
The average spread in the period 1 January 1992 to 24 February 1994 is 7.02 basis points for
197 bond issues, which is statistically lower than the average spread of 38.98 basis points on
2,613 bond issues in the period 25 February 1994 to 31 March 2002 (p value=0.00). This simple
analysis suggests that there was a signiﬁcant increase in spreads around February 1994, but a
more detailed analysis will reveal that the change is attributable to other factors.
17Estimates of equation (2) for spreads using all the data on bond issues between January
1992 and March 2002 are presented in equation (6.1) in Table 6. Most of the control variables
have the expected signs, riskier bonds have larger spreads, ﬁrm’s with a higher Tobin q can
issue bonds with lower spreads, spreads tend to fall when the economy is expected to improve,
and bonds with some sort of mortgage tend to have lower spreads. The signiﬁcance of the
Tobin q variable suggests that earlier analyses of bond spreads in Japan (for example, Hamao
and Hoshi (2000, 2002)) and the United States (for example, Roten and Mullineaux (2002))
which have excluded this variable may well be mis-specﬁed. The three variables included to
take account of changes in macroeconomic conditions, 4 CPI,4 IIP and QDUM, are all highly
signiﬁcant. Earlier analyses for Japan (Hamao and Hoshi (2000, 2002)) do not include any
variables to control for macroeconomic conditions, and analyses for the United States use only
a time trend and/or quarterly dummies (see, for example, Roten and Mullineaux (2002)). Our
results suggest the models used in these analyses may well be mis-speciﬁed. The two variables
associated with bank entry, BANKENTRY and MARKET, both have negative impacts on
spreads, that is, bank entry led to smaller spreads, and an increase in the market share of
bank-owned subsidiaries led to smaller spreads. However, only BANKENTRY is statistically
signiﬁcant. Consistent with the ﬁndings in Hamao and Hoshi (2000) and Takaoka and McKenzie
(2003), the BANK variable is found to be insigniﬁcant. That is, there do not appear to be
any diﬀerences in spreads according to the type of underwriter. Furthermore, neither of the
two main bank variables is signiﬁcant. The key diﬀerence observed when issues are grouped
according to size and ratings, is that BANKENTRY is only signiﬁcant for highly rated ﬁrms.
[Table 6 around here]
Table 7 repeats the analysis in Table 6, but restricts the data to post-entry issues (25
February 1994 - 31 March 2002). MARKET is not signiﬁcant in any of the regressions. Perhaps
a little surprising is the ﬁnding that the BANK variable has a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
for small issues and this provides some weak evidence for the existence of conﬂict of interest
eﬀects. Again there are no main bank eﬀects.
18[Table 7 around here]
7 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper suggests that the entry of bank owned subsidiaries into the under-
writing market for straight corporate bonds in Japan has signiﬁcantly reduced underwriting
commissions on bond issues. While all ﬁrms have beneﬁted from lower commissions, highly
rated ﬁrms appear to enjoy a greater fall in commissions. The impact of this entry is far
weaker for spreads, and again highly rated ﬁrms appear to enjoy a signiﬁcant fall in spreads.
The evidence also points to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the commissions charged by bank owned
subsidiaries and investment houses, and this diﬀerence does not appear to be disappearing over
time.
The evidence for the United States suggests that bank entry into the corporate bond un-
derwriting market was particularly important for small size bonds and for bonds issued by
ﬁrms with poor ratings (see Gande et al (1999)). In addition, banks seem to use their superior
information obtained through lending relationships to help these ﬁrms with poor ratings to
issue bonds. The position for Japan is quite diﬀerent. Japanese banks do not appear to have
developed new areas of the underwriting market that might have exploited their information
advantage, but rather have competed in existing areas.
The signiﬁcance of variables relating to macroeconomic conditions, the annual inﬂation rate
and the annual growth rate of the index of industrial production, and the Tobin q variable in
the spread equation suggest that earlier analyses of spreads in both Japan and the United
States may be mis-speciﬁed.
The results shown in this paper suggest that the ﬁnancial system reform in 1993 was suc-
cessful in reducing bond raising costs. However, the impact of the system reform is signiﬁcantly
greater for highly rated ﬁrms. That is, highly rated ﬁrms paid too much in bond raising costs
prior to the entry of bank subsidiaries.
19Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample Post-Entry
Bank Subsidiary Investment House
Number of Issues 2,797 949 1,662
Commission (yen/10,000 yen issued) 42.77 40.40 42.98
Issue Amount (million yen) 19,676 13,950 21,191
Rating
DAAA (%) 17.8 6.6 20.2
DAA (%) 33.6 39.1 31.9
DA (%) 41.7 47.4 40.4
DBBB (%) 7.0 6.8 7.5
Maturity (years) 7.02 6.69 7.19
Secured (%) 16.9 6.3 19.3
MAINUW (%) 15.9 46.8 0
MAINUW*LOANSHARE(%) 0.02 0.07 0
Spread (basis points) 35.52 43.03 34.77
Tobin q 0.99 0.96 1.00
Age (years) 62.58 64.23 61.62
Notes:
(1) To correspond with the regression analysis in Tables 6 and 7, for the Spread, Tobin q and
Age, the number of issues in each of the three samples are 2145, 859 and 1109, respectively.
(2) The full sample is from 1 January 1992 to 31 March 2002, and the post-entry sample is
from 25 February 1994 to 31 March 2002.
(3) DAAA is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value unity if the issuing ﬁrm’s rating is AAA,
and zero otherwise.
20Table 2: Issuing ﬁrm’s ratings by type of underwriter
ISSUING FIRM’S UNDERWRITER TOTAL
RATING INVESTMENT HOUSE BANK SUBSIDIARY
AAA 336 113 449
AA+ 143 137 280
AA 149 129 278
AA- 249 250 499
A+ 172 155 327
A 240 209 449
A- 263 241 504
BBB+ 38 38 76
BBB 77 48 125
BBB- 9 14 23
TOTAL 1,676 1,334 3,010
SHARE(%) 55 45
Notes:




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 4: Commission diﬀerences between bank subsidiaries and investment houses
YEAR Coeﬃcient T-ratio Sample Size
1994 -2.69 1.11 88
1995 -2.03 2.03∗ 228
1996 -1.18 1.90 326
1997 -3.35 2.21∗ 380
1998 -0.88 1.38 702
1999 -2.63 2.97∗ 359
2000 -4.10 1.97∗ 262
Notes:
(1) This table presents estimates of the coeﬃcient of the bank dummy, α10, in the regression
COMMISSIONj = α0 + α1log(AMOUNTj)+α2DAAj + α3DAj + α4DBBBj + α5NEWj
+α6SMATj + α7LMATj + α9SECUREDj + α10BANKj + α11MAINUWj
+α12(MAINUW) ∗ (LOANSHARE)j +
X
k
βkINDUSTRYjk + uj (3)
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